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I present a conditioning theory of grief. From conditioning research on appetitive 
disorders (e.g., addiction and binge eating), I borrow the concept cue-elicited craving. More 
precisely, the theory postulates that, throughout a life together, a variety of cues become 
associated with the presence of the loved one and that because of this these cues can trigger 
craving and (an action tendency for) searching for the deceased. Starting from this 
perspective, I additionally invoke extinction phenomena to explain the possible persistence of 
grief. Arguably, the theory has good heuristic value, because it allows to explain a variety of 
grief symptoms and to bring together existing knowledge in a unifying learning framework. In 
addition, the theory has good predictive value, because it opens the door to considering new 
research and treatment directions. 
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Finn, a middle-aged male, lost his girlfriend about five years ago [1; prolonged grief]. Finn 
reports that, after the loss, he so intensely longed for her that it would make him “go crazy” 
[2; craving and frustration]. Only about one year ago, it got better, in the sense that since 
then he can be more or less at ease at home [3; extinction]. However, sometimes it is still as 
bad as when she just passed away. To give just a few examples, hearing a romantic song on 
the radio still makes him long for her, as does seeing somebody with the same hairstyle as 
hers. In addition, grief still overtakes him at times when he least expects it. Recent examples 
of this include a trip to the seaside (where he and his girlfriend used to go to relax) and a 
Christmas family gathering [4; (no) generalization of extinction]. He also broke down when 
having spaghetti, her favourite meal, at a restaurant [5; return of responding]. One of the 
reasons that Finn is looking for therapeutic help is that he recently lashed out at his mother 
for accidentally washing his girlfriend’s pillow, an item that he cherished [6; evaluative 
conditioning and sign tracking], but has lost his girlfriend’s scent because of the washing. 
Finn also mentions that he still regularly goes to the square where he and his girlfriend used 
to meet for lunch [7; habit]. In addition, he describes another recent incident that worried 
some people close to him. With a couple of friends, he went to the cinema to see a movie. 
After a vote, the group of friends decided on a movie that happened to be a sequel to a movie 
that he and his girlfriend had seen together. However, 15 minutes into the movie, Finn 
decided to leave and drove his car to the house of his girlfriend’s parents (where he used to 
pick her up when they just started dating). He stayed in his car, parked in front of the house, 
reminiscing about his girlfriend for about two hours, before driving to his current home [8; 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer]. His friends consider Finn’s behaviour to be “abnormal”, 




normal or not, but wonders whether it might mean that he and his girlfriend had a bond so 
special that most people cannot even begin to understand [9; catastrophizing].  
 
 Finn’s name is fictitious, but his story as sketched in the above case study is real. 
Based on the description, he might suffer from prolonged grief (PG). This disorder is 
characterized by disabling symptoms for lengthy periods (according to the least stringent 
criterion for at least six months after the loss; Jordan & Litz, 2014), including intense craving 
and searching for the deceased, being constantly reminded of the deceased, and cherishing 
reminders of the deceased (Boelen, van den Hout, & van den Bout, 2006; Shear, 2015). 
Studies have estimated the prevalence to be 4-5% in the general population and 7-25% among 
bereaved individuals (Kersting, Brähler, Glaesmer, & Wagner, 2011; Newson, Boelen, Hek, 
Hofman, & Tiemeier, 2011). Despite comorbidity with depression and anxiety disorders in 
clinical samples (Simon et al., 2007), PG also occurs independently of these disorders, 
uniquely contributing to increased risk of morbidity and suicide, health problems such as 
myocardial infarction (cf. the proverbial broken heart), and overall reduced quality of life 
(Jordan & Litz, 2014; Shear et al., 2011; Shear, 2015; Stroebe, Schut, & Stroebe, 2007).  
The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) explicitly includes PG as a condition requiring 
further research. The decision to consider (persistent) grief behaviour as a pathology in need 
of diagnosis has not gone uncontested. Researchers have indeed demonstrated that diagnosis 
can lead to stigma (Eisma, 2018) and that current diagnostic criteria allow for a large amount 
of different symptom combinations, which decreases utility of the diagnosis for research and 
practice (Lenferink & Eisma, 2018).  
This controversy notwithstanding, a better understanding of grief is obviously needed. 




that successful grieving involves stages of reaction to loss (for a detailed discussion of a series 
of myths see Wortman & Silver, 1989; Wortman & Boerner, 2011). Knowledge of the 
mechanisms involved in the development and maintenance of grief is important for the early 
identification of those at risk for problematic grief and for the development of more effective 
care. Although cognitive behavioural therapy holds promise, studies have indeed shown that 
some of the current grief therapies are ineffective or even harming rather than helping 
(subgroups of) grieving individuals (Boelen, 2016; Dimidjan & Hollon, 2010; Neimeyer, 
2000).  
In this paper, I explore whether an associative learning framework may help us to 
explain grief behaviour and its possible persistence. Associative learning is a basic 
behavioural capacity shared by human and non-human animals alike and is defined as a 
change in behaviour caused by a co-occurrence of events (De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Moors, 2013). The scientific study of associative learning was given a head start by Pavlov’s 
(1927) famous conditioning experiments in dogs. Since those experiments, the field has kept 
on evolving, leading to more refined experimental designs and theories (for a review see 
Haselgrove, 2016). But, however advanced this research field may have become, can it also 
serve to make sense of one’s innermost reactions in response to the loss of a loved one? 
Below, I argue that associative learning theory can indeed go a long way in providing insight 
in some important aspects of grief. After introducing the theory, I will discuss the relation 
between this theory and existing theories about grief (for an elegant review of existing 
theories see Maccallum & Bryant, 2011).  
 
Conditioning 
 An important building block of the proposed theory is appetitive conditioning. Before 




concept. Studies on the topic of food craving and addiction have demonstrated that cues that 
have been paired with a desired outcome can come to elicit what is termed cue-elicited 
craving: Intense longing for the substance that goes hand in hand with (an action tendency 
for) approach or search behaviour (Jansen, 1998; Zellner & Edwards, 2001). For example, in 
a laboratory paradigm developed by Van Gucht and colleagues, two serving trays are used as 
cues and eating a piece of chocolate is used as the desired outcome (e.g., Van Gucht, 
Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Beckers, 2010; Van Gucht, Vansteenwegen, Beckers, 
& Van den Bergh, 2008; Van Gucht, Vansteenwegen, Van den Bergh, & Beckers, 2008). 
Both serving trays are shortly and alternately presented on a little table in front of participants 
before being taken away again. Crucially, while one of the trays is on the table, participants 
are always asked to eat a piece of chocolate, whereas they never get to eat chocolate when the 
other tray is on the table. As a result, the serving tray paired with chocolate consumption, but 
not the other, typically comes to elicit craving for chocolate: People report longing for 
chocolate when seeing this tray. This tray also comes to elicit an action tendency for approach 
behaviour (as measured in a stimulus-response compatibility reaction time task; Van Gucht et 
al., 2008b). Such action tendency can be understood as a goal or inclination to act, but does 
not necessarily translate in an overt action (Moors, Boddez, & De Houwer, 2017). Similar 
results have been obtained in a laboratory paradigm in which nicotine rather than chocolate is 
used as a desired outcome (Thewissen, Snijders, Havermans, van den Hout, & Jansen, 2006; 
Thewissen, van den Hout, Havermans, & Jansen, 2005).  
Taken together and making abstraction of specific laboratory paradigms, this type of 
findings shows that environmental cues paired with a desired outcome can make people crave 
for that outcome and can trigger (an action tendency to) searching behaviour. This abstract 
principle can be made more intuitive by applying it to daily life experiences that everybody 




makes us crave eating a waffle and search for a waffle stand. Indeed, in such situation, the 
craving could be explained by the assumption that this smell (i.e., the cue) previously co-
occurred with the consumption of waffles (i.e., the desired outcome). Analogously, seeing 
somebody with a glass of beer can make us crave having a beer, because of the previous co-
occurrence of these events (Collins & Brandon, 2002).  
This paper’s central claim is that a similar principle may explain some crucial 
characteristics of grief. More precisely, I theorize that, throughout a life together, cues 
become associated with the presence of the loved one, which functions as desired outcome, 
and that because of this these cues may develop the potential to trigger craving for the loved 
one and to trigger an action tendency for searching behaviour. All three components of this 
theoretical statement —the roles of the cues, of the desired outcome and of the triggered 
responses— deserve comment.  
With respect to the role of the cues, it is important to note that it is assumed that these 
may be external and/or internal, depending on the individual learning history. An example of 
an external cue associated with the presence of the other could be a shared double bed or the 
place where the deceased used to work. An example of an internal cue could be feeling 
miserable or in need of social support, given that the deceased person used to make sure 
he/she was present in such situations (for an extensive discussion of conditioning with 
internal cues see Zaman, De Peuter, Van Diest, Van den Bergh, & Vlaeyen, 2016).  
With respect to the claim that the presence of a loved one can function as a desired 
outcome, a recent study demonstrated that activating the mental representation of the lost one 
activates brain regions that are also central in addiction (O’Connor et al., 2008). It is also of 
note that, theoretically speaking, every stimulus can become a desired outcome (Moors et al., 
2017), making the claim that the presence of a loved one can function as such a desired 




that people value positively and is something for which people go to great lengths (e.g., travel 
a long way).  
With respect to the triggered responses, appetitively conditioned responding appears to 
be a strong match for grief behaviour. The craving corresponds with the longing and yearning 
for the deceased person which numerous studies have identified as the cardinal symptom of 
PG (Prigerson et al., 2009; Shear, 2015). The action tendency for searching behaviour can be 
seen as corresponding to the urge to restore proximity to the lost person. This can occur 
literally by visiting the grave, but may also manifest itself in, for example, looking out for the 
deceased person in familiar places or the wish to die in order to be with the deceased person 
(Boelen et al., 2006; Boelen, 2016). In PG, these responses have two features that make them 
especially disabling. The first feature is that, by definition, symptoms persist for a very long 
time (i.e., they are prolonged). The second feature is that numerous stimuli and situations 
trigger these symptoms (Boelen et al., 2006; Lichtenthal, Cruess, & Prigersson, 2004; 
Raphael & Martinek, 1997). Both features fit well with an associative learning account and 
will be discussed in later sections of this paper (see sections on extinction and generalization).  
 
Extinction 
 As discussed above, throughout a life together, cues can become associated with the 
presence of the loved one. After the decease, these cues (e.g., the shared double bed) will, for 
obvious reasons, no longer co-occur with the presence of the loved one. Repeated 
presentation of a cue without an outcome typically results in a reduction of conditioned 
responding (i.e., extinction; Bouton, 2002). The craving response, however, is known to 
extinguish relatively slower than other conditioned responses. In, for example, the research 
paradigm of Van Gucht and colleagues described above, repeatedly presenting the serving 




readily cease cue-elicited craving. Even when participants report that they no longer expect to 
eat chocolate, their craving for chocolate remains high when seeing this serving tray (e.g., 
Van Gucht et al., 2008a; Van Gucht et al., 2008b).2 Translating this to grief, this would 
correspond to a situation in which one does not subjectively expect the loved one to be 
present anymore, but nonetheless still craves for his/her presence. We can also recognize the 
slow extinction of craving in the above-described case study of Finn: Only after up to four 
years after losing his girlfriend, he managed to be at ease at home [see 1 & 3 in the case 
study]. By that time, there will have been many instances in which the event of being in the 
house and being in the presence of his girlfriend did not co-occur.     
What is more is that research on appetitive conditioning suggests that craving can even 
temporarily increase —rather than extinguish or decrease— due to non-occurrence of the 
desired outcome (Tiffany, 1999). Similarly, outcome deprivation is known to increase 
appetitive responding (Mitchell & Gormezano, 1970). This seems to confirm the adage that 
absence makes the heart grow fonder. As such, this provides an important backbone of the 
conditioning theory of grief, since it certainly seems that the craving for the loved one 
increases after the decease.  
In addition, outcome deprivation can lead to anger and frustration. Tiffany (1999) 
illustrates this with a case of an alcoholic who started craving beer (i.e., the desired outcome) 
because of seeing a beer stand at a festival (i.e., the cue). On closer examination, he 
discovered that the beer stand was closed for remodelling. This obstacle not only resulted in 
enhanced craving, but also in anger and frustration at being thwarted in the attempt to drink. 
Importantly, this case description is corroborated by an extensive literature of animal 
experiments (Amsel, 1992; Amsel, 1994). Rats demonstrate behaviour indicative of 
frustration (e.g., vigorously trying out different responses, aggression towards the 




reward) remains absent in a situation where it had been present previously (Amsel, 1992). 
Translating this to the case study of Finn, this seems to correspond to him reporting that, in 
the beginning, he used to “go crazy” of longing [see 2 in the case study]. The absence of his 
girlfriend seemed to not only intensify his longing for her, but also to be extremely 
frustrating.   
On top of these difficulties with the initial extinction of craving, experimental research 
on extinction of conditioned responding (Bouton, 2002; Vervliet, Baeyens, Van den Bergh, & 
Hermans, 2013; Vervliet, Craske, & Hermans, 2013) has revealed a number of additional 
characteristics that can explain why overcoming grief can be especially difficult: (1) 
extinction generalizes poorly and (2) successfully extinguished responses can still return at a 
later time. Below, I discuss these difficulties.  
 
Generalization. Research has shown that even when extinction is successful, it does 
not readily generalize to other cues (Barry, Griffith, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; Boddez et 
al., 2012; Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). In, for example, the 
study of Barry and colleagues (2016), a cue was paired with an (in their study, aversive) 
outcome in a first phase, so that it came to elicit conditioned (fear) responding. In the 
subsequent extinction phase, a different but perceptually similar cue was presented without 
the outcome. This perceptually similar cue elicited the same amount of conditioned 
responding at the beginning of the extinction phase, which then as expected gradually 
decreased throughout the extinction phase. Crucially, Barry et al. demonstrated that this 
successful extinction learning did not generalize to other cues: The presentation of yet another 
perceptually similar cue still led to conditioned responding. Translating this to Finn, it is of 
note that, after a while, being at home did not elicit longing for his girlfriend anymore [see 3 




cues. For example, grief still overtook him when making a trip to the seaside [see 4 in the case 
study and note that Finn and his girlfriend often went to the seaside together, making it likely 
that being at the seaside has become associated with her being present]. Experiments such as 
that of Barry et al. (2016) suggest that Finn will have to learn separately that being at the 
seaside does not mean that he will be enjoying his girlfriend’s presence, that his girlfriend will 
no longer be present at Christmas family gatherings and that seeing somebody with the same 
hairstyle as her in the distance does not mean that he and his girlfriend can walk up to each 
other and be in each other’s company [see 4 in the case study].  
This lack of generalization of extinction learning helps to explain why grieving can be 
more difficult after a long-lasting relationship in which many activities were shared, like a 
parent-child relationship or a partner relationship (Boelen, 2016; Lobb et al., 2006). In such 
cases, there will be many more cues that have been linked to the presence of the loved one 
and that will have to be extinguished separately.  
At the same time and in contrast with this narrow generalization of extinction, the 
experiment of Barry et al. (2016; also see Boddez et al. 2012) also illustrates that acquisition 
learning does generalize widely: The conditioned responding that was established to one cue, 
was also elicited by a perceptually similar cue (as evidenced by high responding to this 
perceptually similar cue at the very beginning of the extinction phase). This wider 
generalization of acquisition is a well-established finding in a variety of conditioning 
preparations (Bouton, 2002). In fact, more and more evidence is emerging that such 
generalization of acquisition is a crucial pathological process across mental disorders 
(Hermans & Baeyens, 2013; Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013). Take, for example, a 
person who gets bitten by an aggressive dog. Only if this person develops conditioned fear for 
not only this dog, but for dogs in general, would one speak of dog phobia. In this respect, 




(Hermans & Baeyens, 2013; Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche, & Hermans, 2015). In the 
case of perceptual generalization, a cue that shares perceptual elements with a cue that co-
occurred with the outcome also comes to elicit conditioned responding (Boddez, Bennett, van 
Esch, & Beckers, 2017). For example, not only the previously shared double bed may elicit 
craving for the loved one, but also seeing a sofa for two persons in a furniture boutique. In the 
case of conceptual generalization, conditioned responding that is established to one cue is also 
elicited by conceptually related cues (even if these cues do not show perceptual overlap; 
Bennet, Vervoort, Boddez, Hermans, & Baeyens, 2015). For example, Finn’s grief responses 
elicited by hearing a love song on the radio may be understood as an instance of conceptual 
generalization [see 4 in the case study]. Both the shared double bed and the song could be 
considered members of a conceptual category “things concerning two people”, providing the 
basis for such generalization.  
 
Return of Responding. In the section above, it was discussed that, due to narrow 
generalization of extinction learning and wide generalization of acquisition learning, 
responding to a wide array of cues has to be extinguished separately when losing a loved one. 
Further explaining why it may be difficult to overcome grief, research has also demonstrated 
that even when responding to an individual cue is extinguished successfully, responding to 
this very same cue can return later on. More precisely, a variety of conditions, including 
context switches and even the mere passage of time, can trigger a return of original 
responding. For example, if cue and outcome first co-occur in context A, and the cue is then 
successfully extinguished in context B, the cue can come to elicit renewed conditioned 
responding when it is presented in context A again or in a novel context C (ABA renewal or 
ABC renewal respectively; Bouton, 2002; Vervliet et al., 2013a; Vervliet et al., 2013b). This 




also been confirmed in the above-described laboratory paradigm by Van Gucht and 
colleagues. In a variant of their standard paradigm, they created two different contexts by 
using different lighting in the room, resulting in the room being either relatively brightly lit or 
relatively dark (Van Gucht et al., 2008a; Van Gucht et al., 2008b). During acquisition, one of 
the serving trays was paired with chocolate consumption in one context. During the 
subsequent extinction phase, both trays were presented without chocolate in the other context. 
When participants were then tested in the original acquisition context, a renewal effect was 
observed, evidenced by restored approach tendencies and by participants reporting that they 
again expected to eat chocolate when seeing the tray that had previously been paired with 
chocolate consumption.  
What does all this mean for grief? As said, throughout a life together, cues will 
become associated with the presence of the loved one. After the decease, one will learn that 
these cues no longer co-occur with the presence of the loved one (i.e., extinction learning). 
However, there can always be a return of responding. Let us illustrate this with an example. 
After the decease, the shared double bed will no longer co-occur with the presence of the 
loved one, which will ultimately lead to a decrease in conditioned responding. At a later time, 
the double bed may however come to elicit renewed responding. Suppose, for example, that 
Finn would move to another house. If he reassembles the very same bed in his new house, it 
may come to elicit longing for his girlfriend again because of the context switch. In the case 
study, it is also described that Finn broke down when having a spaghetti (which was his 
girlfriend’s favourite meal) at a restaurant [see 5 in the case study]. Even though he reported 
in a later therapy session to have often made this meal at home since her passing (supposedly 
leading to extinction of the relation between spaghetti and the presence of his girlfriend), the 





Evaluative Conditioning. At this point, I want to broaden the scope to an in this 
paper hitherto ignored conditioned response that may be of relevance for grief. Conditioned 
valence refers to a change in the valence of a cue that is due to co-occurrence with a positive 
or negative outcome (De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, 2011). A series of studies found that 
conditioned valence does not extinguish (e.g., Vansteenwegen, Francken, Vervliet, De Clercq, 
& Eelen, 2006).3 In the context of grief, a cue that is positively valenced because of its pairing 
with the loved person may therefore retain its positive valence for a long time. In the case 
study of Finn, it is mentioned that he cherishes his girlfriend’s pillow [see 6 in the case study]. 
One may assume that the valence of the pillow is due to his girlfriend having used it (i.e., due 
to the previous co-occurrence of the pillow and his girlfriend). Other behaviour that is often 
seen in grief can be understood in this way as well. Consider, for example, parents who have 
lost their child and keep a piece of his/her clothing or a plush toy on a little altar in the house. 
Starting from an associative learning perspective, one would say that the valence of these 
items was acquired through their co-occurrence with the presence of the child and may be 
fairly permanent. 
Finn’s behaviour with respect to the pillow, and cherishing behaviour in general, 
cannot only be explained by invoking the concept of conditioned valence, but also by 
invoking a learning phenomenon termed sign-tracking. Sign tracking, which has been 
extensively studied in rats, describes the propensity of subjects to behaviourally engage 
(touching, gnawing, sniffing, etc.) with a cue that has been paired with a desired outcome 
(e.g., a food reward; Flagel, Akil, & Robinson, 2009; Meyer, Ma, & Robinson, 2012; 
Morrison, Bamkole, Nicola, 2015). Studies have found support for the hypothesis that sign 
tracking involves the cue acquiring the incentive value of the outcome. As such, the cue 
becomes a desired outcome itself or, in other words, the content of a goal (Moors et al., 2017). 




elegant analogy for the cherishing of items in the context of grief. Just imagine Finn 
snuggling his head into the pillow and cuddling it as if it was his girlfriend and compare this 
to a rat treating a cue as if it was his food reward. With respect to Finn lashing out at his 
mother for washing the pillow with his girlfriend’s scent [see 6 in the case study], it is of note 
that, according to appraisal theories, the interference with goal satisfaction may elicit 
aggression (Moors et al., 2017). More precisely, by washing the pillow, the desired outcome 
was destroyed and the goal of making contact with it could no longer be satisfied.  
 
Instrumental Learning. Next to cues, one may of course also associate one’s own 
behaviour with the outcome of being in the presence of the loved one. For example, 
throughout a life together, going to a certain place might systematically result in being in the 
company of the loved one. Behaviour that results from the relation between the behaviour and 
its outcome is termed instrumental or operant behaviour (Bouton, 2007; De Houwer et al., 
2013).   
 
 Habits. In the learning literature, the dominant view is that instrumental behaviour can 
be either goal-directed or habitual. In the case of goal-directed behaviour, the behaviour is 
driven by the desired outcome (i.e., the goal). In the example above, going to that place would 
be driven by the desired outcome of being in the presence of the loved one. However, through 
repetition, goal-directed behaviour can become habitual (Wood and Rünger, 2016). I propose 
to define habitual behaviour at the phenomenological level as behaviour that is no longer 
driven by the outcome that initially installed it. An elegant and well-established procedure to 
assess whether behaviour has actually become habitual is the outcome devaluation procedure 
(Adams & Dickinson, 1981; Heyes & Dickinson, 1993). In the first phase of such a 




(e.g., food). To investigate whether the behaviour is (still) caused by the outcome, it is in a 
subsequent test phase assessed whether manipulating the outcome changes the behaviour. One 
can do this by changing the value of the outcome (e.g., by satiating the subject with food 
before the test, so that food is no longer highly valued) or by omitting the outcome altogether 
(i.e., extinction training). If these manipulations do not have an effect on the response, it is 
concluded that this behaviour is not driven by the outcome and is therefore habitual.  
The habit concept may explain why Finn still regularly goes to the square where he 
and his girlfriend used to meet for lunch [see 7 in the case study]. Given that they often used 
to meet there, the behaviour of going to the square around lunchtime might, through 
repetition, have become habitual and therefore insensitive to omission of the outcome of 
being in the presence of his girlfriend.4 
Next to more cues being associated with the outcome of being in the presence of the 
loved one (as discussed in the section on generalization above), habit formation is another 
factor that provides insight in why grieving can be more difficult after a long-lasting 
relationship in which many activities were repeatedly done together (Boelen, 2016; Lobb et 
al., 2010). In this case, a wide set of behaviours might, through repetition, have become 
insensitive to omission of the outcome of being in the presence of the loved one. Such 
enduring behaviour might be interpreted as a failure to integrate the reality of the loss into 
one’s mental representations. 
 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. The interaction between cue-elicited responding (as 
discussed in the previous sections of this paper) and instrumental behaviour (as discussed in 
the current section of this paper) may also provide insight in some aspects of grief behaviour. 
Conditioning research has revealed an effect termed Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (Pit; 




outcome (i.e., Pavlovian learning) and participants are separately trained to perform an 
instrumental response to obtain the same outcome (i.e., instrumental learning). In the test 
phase, the cue is presented while the instrumental response can be emitted. The typical result 
is that the cue, relative to appropriate control cues, will elicit the response that previously 
resulted in the outcome (i.e., Pit). For example, Lovibond and Colagiuri (2013) developed a 
procedure in which participants first learned that a coloured light resulted in chocolate and 
then were separately trained to press a button to receive the same chocolate outcome. In the 
transfer test, they observed that presentation of the chocolate-paired cue led to a higher rate of 
button pressing than a control cue. Interestingly, we may assume such a Pit effect to be at play 
in the incident in which Finn suddenly left the cinema and drove to the house of his 
girlfriend’s parents [see 8 in the case study]. With respect to the Pavlovian learning, it is 
important to know that the movie that Finn and his friends were watching was a sequel to a 
movie that he and his girlfriend had seen together. Therefore, this movie can be seen as a 
(generalized) cue that has been associated with the presence of his girlfriend. With respect to 
the instrumental learning, driving to her parents’ house can be seen as instrumental behaviour 
that previously resulted in being in her presence, because he used to pick her up there when 
they just started dating. So, in line with the events described in the case study, a Pit effect 
would indeed imply that the movie, as a cue, would elicit driving to her parents’ house, the 
instrumental behaviour. The reason that the Pit effect is discussed in this section is that Pit, 
just like habits, is fairly insensitive to extinction training. More specifically, attempts to 
reduce Pit by presenting the cue without the desired outcome have produced mixed results 
(Lovibond, Satkunarajah, & Colagiuri, 2015; Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 2016). This 
means that repeatedly going to the movie without being in the presence of his girlfriend will 
by itself not necessarily lower Finn’s tendency to emit behaviour that previously resulted in 




response no longer results in the desired outcome (Cartoni et al., 2016). In the case of Finn, 
this would imply that experiencing that driving to her parent’s house, as preceded by being at 
the movies, does not result in being in her presence would eventually make such behaviour 
disappear. So, contrary to the intuition of Finn’s friends, his behaviour can be made insightful 
and would eventually disappear by itself [see 9 in the case study]. 
 
Avoidance. Cues that are associated with traumatic loss may come to elicit avoidance, 
similar to what happens in anxiety disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder; PTSD). For 
example, if the grieving person is a survivor of the car accident in which the loved one died, 
then he may avoid the place of the accident (e.g., because that place elicits intrusions or elicits 
fear of a new accident; Wegerer, Blechert, Kerschbaum, & Wilhelm, 2013). Such 
instrumental avoidance is known to strongly interfere with extinction learning as it prevents 
exposure to traumatic cues and thereby symptom reduction (Craske, Treanor, Conway, 
Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014).  
Avoidance may also play a role in grief that does not completely overlap with its role 
in anxiety disorders. The theory presented in this paper is built on the assumption that, 
throughout a life together, certain cues will come to signal the desired outcome of being in the 
presence of the loved one. Crucially, after the loss, new signal relations might come into play:  
These same cues will now come to signal negative affect like frustration that is caused by the 
absence of the loved one (see discussion above; Amsel, 1992; Amsel, 1994).  Once these new 
signal relations are learned, instrumental avoidance could come into the picture. Avoidance 
would serve the function of not being confronted with this negative affect. For example, after 
the loss the previously shared double bed would come to result in the outcome of 
experiencing negative affect, so by staying away from the bed one would avoid the negative 




(1947) to grief. The theory of Mowrer assumes that avoidance is reinforced by fear reduction. 
In our example, the grieving person could fear coming to experience negative affect like 
frustration when being in the presence of the bed. Leaving the room with the bed would then 
be reinforced by the reduction in fear of having to go through this negative affect.  
Interestingly, patients who have been diagnosed with prolonged grief do not only 
display relatively stronger avoidance (Eisma et al., 2014; Eisma et al., 2015), but also stronger 
approach of reminder cues as compared to healthy controls (Maccallum, Sawday, Rinck, & 
Bryant, 2015). Learning theory offers one way to solve the apparently paradoxical co-
existence of approach and avoidance in grief. Learning theorists have hypothesized that 
conditioning comprises two forms of learning: learning about signal relations and learning 
about referential relations (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Eelen, 2001). Cues that 
once signaled the presence of the love one can come to elicit avoidance after the loss as 
outlined in the paragraph above. However, cues can also have a mere referential relation to an 
outcome (Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1992). This can be explained by use 
of the following example. A holiday souvenir can refer to a pleasant evening abroad without 
having signal value. As such, the souvenir can make one think about the evening abroad, but 
it will not elicit the expectancy of an imminent pleasant evening (Baeyens et al., 1992; 
Baeyens et al., 2001). Similarly, a religious relic –  like a piece of cloth that has made contact 
with the body of Jesus Christ – can refer to Jesus Christ but does not have signal value with 
respect to His imminent presence. As opposed to cues with signal value, I put forward the 
hypothesis that cues with a mere referential relation to the loved one will elicit approach 
behaviour (e.g., the pillow in the case study of Finn). Cues that have a mere referential 
relation will indeed not come to elicit negative affect like frustration when the loved one stays 
absent because there was no expectancy about the presence of the loved one in the first place. 




one will come to elicit avoidance, whereas cues that merely refer to the loved one will come 
to elicit approach. Learning theorists have developed techniques to install referential relations 
as separate from signal relations (for details see Baeyens et al., 2001), which would allow to 
assess this hypothesis in the laboratory.  
 
Evaluation 
The quality of every theory depends on the extent to which it allows to organize existing 
knowledge (i.e., its heuristic value) and the extent to which it allows to generate new 
knowledge (i.e., its predictive value; De Houwer et al., 2013). Before I turn to the evaluation 
of the heuristic and predictive value of the conditioning account of grief, I will summarize its 
basic premises. 
 
Summary. The theory states that throughout a life together, a variety of external cues 
(e.g., a shared bed or the workplace) and internal cues (e.g., feeling in need of social support) 
become associated with the presence of the other. Presumably, these events develop the 
potential to elicit the expectancy that the other will be present, to trigger craving, and to 
trigger searching behaviour that would result in restoration of proximity if the loved one were 
still alive (e.g., looking out for the deceased in familiar places). As in addiction, craving in 
grief may become especially strong and frustrating because access to the deceased is blocked 
for obvious reasons. That is, the loss of the loved one forces one into a situation of extinction 
learning. The crucial aspects of what can make grief so disabling, is (1) that symptoms can 
persist for a very long time and (2) that numerous stimuli can trigger memories of the 
deceased. It was proposed that this is respectively (1) due to slow or non-permanent 
extinction of (a subset of) conditioned responses and (2) due to excessive generalization of 




light on why some reminders elicit cherishing behaviour. With respect to one’s own 
behaviour, instrumental behaviours (e.g., going to a certain place) that previously resulted in 
being in presence of the loved one may become habitual and therefore persist even when they 
no longer result in this desired outcome. Pit concerns the interaction between cue-elicited 
responding and instrumental behaviour. More precisely, it describes how cues that have been 
associated with the presence of the loved one can lead individuals to actively seek out their 
company. In case of decease of the loved one, this would of course be in vain. Finally, cues 
that once signaled the presence of the love one can come to elicit avoidance because they 
come to signal negative affect like frustration that is caused by the absence of the loved one.  
 
Heuristic Value. The conditioning account of grief has good scope (Hughes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Vahey, 2012), since it can explain a variety of topographically different 
behaviours characteristic of it. When having another look at the case study, a wide range of 
complex behaviour is described. Although most of the behaviour in the case study may 
already evoke some intuitive understanding (and sympathy), the theory allows explaining this 
behaviour by invoking well-established learning principles. What is more is that the theory is 
not limited to grief after death, since the same learning principles may explain grieving after 
divorce and other types of break-up between individuals. The only two requirements for the 
learning principles to be applied are (a) that a loved one is involved (i.e., that there is a 
desired outcome) and (b) that there was a shared life (i.e., that there are cues and behaviours 
that have become associated with the presence of the loved one). 
 
Strength of grief. It is of note that these same two requirements may also shed light on 
the strength of grief. An empirically established predictor of the strength of grief is who has 




higher risk of PG (Boelen, 2016). In such case, the two requirements are indeed best fulfilled: 
partners and children are loved ones that will have shared a great deal of activities with the 
surviving person. The latter means that a plethora of cues and behaviours will be associated 
with the presence of the loved one. Let us, for the sake of clarity, compare this with a person 
who loses a grandfather who he rarely sees. Although maybe harsh to say, this person will 
probably not have loved his grandfather as much as he loves his partner or children (i.e., there 
is a less effective desired outcome) and, not many cues and activities will be associated with 
the presence of the grandfather. Accordingly, the theory would (correctly) predict that grief is 
less intense in this case. Obviously, it is still possible that grief may take other forms than the 
frustrating cue-elicited craving that the theory considers important, so that there can still be a 
form of (non-pathological) grieving for the grandfather in this example.  
One related learning mechanism that I have not discussed yet and that can explain why 
grief can be worse after a long-lasting relationship deserves mentioning here. Solomon and 
Corbit (1974) noticed that emotional reactions to a stimulus change with repeated 
confrontation to it. In this context, they described changes in reaction to (illegal) drugs due to 
repeated administration. For example, when using heroin for the first time, one would 
experience a strong high and little withdrawal. However, with repeated administration this 
reaction flips, and one would experience a poor high and strong withdrawal. Solomon and 
Corbit (1974) give a plethora of examples in which they recognize a similar pattern and 
shortly mention grief in this context as well. When one goes on a first date, one might indeed 
experience very strong excitement during the date, but one would typically experience little 
“withdrawal” (loneliness) after the date. However, after years of marriage with that person the 
reaction may flip as well: Excitement in the presence of this person may reduce substantially, 
but withdrawal may increase strongly. In the case of decease of the loved one, this withdrawal 




strong after a long-lasting relationship according to the insights of Solomon and Corbit 
(1974). In addition, prediction error upon breaking a well-learned contingency between a cue 
/ behaviour and a desired outcome is likely to be stronger than upon breaking a newly learned 
contingency (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Such increase in prediction error can cause 
negative affect (Van de Cruys, 2017) and as such account for stronger grief after a long-
lasting relationship (implying well-learned contingencies between cues / behaviours and the 
presence of the loved one) at the mental level. 
The strength of grief is not only determined by who has died and the nature of the 
relationship, but also by the abruptness of the decease: An unexpected death is more likely to 
lead to persistent grief, as compared to an expected death (e.g., after chronic illness; Boelen, 
2016; Boelen, De Keijser, & Smid, 2015; Kristensen, Weisæth, & Heir, 2012). We may try to 
explain this empirical observation by invoking principles embedded in the conditioning 
theory. One could speculate that, in the case of chronic and terminal disease of the loved one, 
some of the necessary extinction learning already occurs before death. For example, an ill 
partner might not sleep in the shared bed anymore, because he/she stays in the hospital or 
cannot climb the stairs anymore.  Interestingly, a gradual decrease in outcome omission is 
also known to diminish later return of extinguished conditioned responding (Gershman, 
Jones, Norman, Monfils, & Niv, 2013; Shiban, Wittmann, Weissinger, & Mühlberger, 2015). 
In case of chronic disease, the presence of the loved might indeed gradually decrease (e.g., 
because the loved one is progressively less and less at home), hence allowing for such more 
permanent extinction learning. In such case, it is as if the state of the world in which the loved 
one is still present gradually fades into a state of the world in which the loved one is absent. 
Gershman et al. (2013) hypothesized that — at the mental level  — such gradual change in 
states allows the individual to permanently update and adapt to the new state of affairs. In 




the risk that the individual would sometimes behave as if the old state of affairs still holds 
(e.g., behave as if the loved one was still alive). 
In addition, in the case of protracted illness, being in the presence of the (suffering) 
loved one may become difficult or hard to bear. Consequently, this presence would no longer 
function as a positive or appetitive outcome. Such change in valence of the outcome is known 
to decrease conditioned responding (e.g., Rescorla, 1974) and could be expected to reduce the 
symptoms typically seen in grief. 
  
Transdiagnostic framework. As mentioned previously, comorbidity is not uncommon 
in the case of PG (Simon et al., 2007).  The most common is comorbidity with depression and 
PTSD (Jordan & Litz, 2014).  
From the present perspective, this comorbidity can be understood by assuming that 
common learning mechanisms play a role in comorbid disorders. For example, habit learning, 
discussed above as a possible factor underlying persistent grief, has also been proposed as a 
mechanism underlying (rumination leading to) depression 
(Lijima, Takano, Boddez, Raes, Tanno, 2017; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014).  
A second way to understand the comorbidity between PG and depression is through 
the research on learned helplessness. This research shows that the inability to secure desired 
outcomes (e.g., being safe) leads to enduring passivity and emotional problems that 
correspond to the symptoms of depression (Overmier, 1996). Similarly, the inability to secure 
the desired outcome of being in the presence of the loved one might lead to symptoms of 
depression.  
Finally, a third way to understand the comorbidity between grief and depression is by 
considering the presence of the loved one to be a controlling stimulus (Ferster, 1966; Costello, 




discussed before), but also as controlling stimulus of instrumental behaviour. That is, this 
presence may activate mental presentations of desired outcomes (i.e., goals; e.g., having a 
tasty and healthy meal) and thereby trigger instrumental behaviour that allows to secure these 
outcomes (e.g., cooking such meal). The absence of the loved one precludes this goal priming 
mechanism (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007) and could therefore lead to enduring 
passivity (e.g., no longer engaging in cooking meals) as seen in depression.  
With respect to comorbidity with PTSD, it is of note that some of the learning 
principles that I proposed to be at play in PG have already been proposed as mechanisms 
underlying PTSD (e.g., slow extinction and excessive generalization; Boddez, Baeyens, 
Hermans, & Beckers, 2013; Guthrie & Bryant, 2006; Lenaert et al., 2014). This provides a 
possible pathway towards comorbidity between PG and PTSD. What is more is that the death 
of a loved one can be considered to be a traumatic event, especially when it concerns an 
unexpected (e.g., violent) death (Boelen, 2016; Boelen et al., 2015; Kristensen et al., 2012). 
This makes insightful why symptoms of grief (i.e., behavioural changes caused by the death 
of a loved one) and symptoms of PTSD (i.e., behavioural changes caused by a traumatic 
event) can co-exist in the same person.  
 
Relation with existing models. In this section, I compare the conditioning account 
with three existing theories about grief (Boelen, van den Hout, and van den Bout, 2006; Shear 
and Shair, 2005; Stroebe and Schut, 1999; for an elegant review see Maccallum & Bryant, 
2013). I will hereby try to bridge the gap between construct formulations in the present 
learning theory and construct formulations in these existing theories. Accordingly, the present 
theory should not be seen as competing with these existing theories, but rather as compatible.  
 




cognitive behavioural conceptualization of PG. They identified three problematic processes: 
(a) poor integration of the loss in autobiographical memory; (b) the use of avoidance 
strategies, and (c) negative appraisal about the self, the loss, and one’s grief reactions.  
From the present perspective, the poor integration of the loss in autobiographical 
memory can be understood as corresponding to the above-discussed extinction deficits. More 
precisely, a plethora of cues will be associated with the presence of the loved one. These cues 
can make one expect, crave or search for this presence. As discussed, extinction of some of 
these responses may go slowly and, in addition, successful extinction also generalizes poorly. 
In the case study, it is, for example, described that after some years Finn did not show grief 
symptoms anymore when being at home, but experienced a resurgence of grief responses 
when making a trip to the seaside or when going to a Christmas family gathering [see 4 and 5 
in the case study]. The fact that after the death a plethora of cues can still make one expect or  
search for the presence of the loved one can of course be described as a poor integration of the 
loss in autobiographical memory. Similarly, emitting habitual behaviour (e.g., still setting the 
table for the loved one) may give the impression that one conducts oneself as if the loved one 
were still alive.  
As shortly mentioned above, the problematic aspect of using avoidance strategies can 
also be understood from the perspective of extinction learning. Extensive research has shown 
that avoidance behaviour interferes with extinction learning (Volders, Boddez, De Peuter, 
Meulders, & Vlaeyen, 2015). If, for example, a grieving person sleeps on the couch in the 
living room instead of in the previously shared bed (example from Shear, 2015), there is no 
opportunity to experience that the bed no longer co-occurs with presence of the loved one and 
therefore there will be no extinction learning.  
The role of negative appraisals about the self, the loss, and one’s grief reactions are 




catastrophizing may help to bridge the gap (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Catastrophizing about 
one’s conditioned responses increases the subjective threat value of these responses, since it 
endows these symptoms with a threatening meaning. For example, one might interpret strong 
craving for the loved one as a sign that one should not go on without him/her and that one 
would be better off dead too. It is of note that we can recognize this catastrophizing in a mild 
form in the case study in which Finn wonders whether his symptoms signify that he and his 
girlfriend had a bond so special that most people cannot even begin to understand [see 9 in the 
case study]. In the section on predictive value, I will argue that such catastrophizing can be an 
important target of psycho-education.  
 
Shear and Shair (2005). Shear and Shair’s (2005) attachment based model of PG is 
quite different from that of Boelen et al. (2006). The central thesis of this model is that the 
loss of a loved one leads to a mismatch between the mental representation of the attachment 
figure as available and the reality of his/her absence. This mismatch activates the attachment 
system, but the attachment figure will not be available to ease the stress of the mismatch. The 
vicious circle will end when the permanence of the loss is integrated in memory. These 
premises are in line with the appetitive conditioning theory of PG. As said, the theory 
assumes that, throughout a life together, a plethora of cues and behaviours become associated 
with the presence of the loved one. However, the death of the loved one forces one into 
extinction learning because the loved one will no longer be present. This matches Shear and 
Shair’s idea of the mismatch between the representation of the attachment figure as available 
and their actual absence. It was also discussed that internal cues (e.g., feeling stressed and in 
need of social support) may become associated with the presence of the loved one, given that 
the loved one made sure that he/she was available in such situations. This can be seen as the 




system and the expectancy that the attachment figure will be available. Finally, the theory 
implies that grieving will stop when all associations between the cues and the presence of the 
loved one are permanently extinguished, which matches Shear and Shair’s idea that grieving 
will end when the permanence of the loss is integrated in memory.  
 
Stroebe and Schut (1999). The third existing theory to which I compare the 
conditioning account is a model that was introduced by Stroebe and Schut (1999). These 
authors propose that successful grief should be understood as the ability to flexibly oscillate 
between a focus on aspects of the loss (e.g., remembering the loved one) and a focus on 
restoration (e.g., doing new things). The model has made a strong impact in the literature, 
although some authors pointed out that the cognitive and functional mechanisms involved in 
loss and restoration-oriented processing have not yet been explicitly clarified (Maccallum and 
Bryant, 2013). One could also argue that the theory focuses more on a description of 
successful recovery from grief than on its etiology. For this reason, I postpone the comparison 
with this theory to the paragraph on treatment implications. There I will argue that the 
positive effects of focussing on loss and restoration can be understood as resulting from, 
respectively, facilitated extinction learning and association splitting. 
 
Predictive value. As said, the value of a theory not only depends on whether it allows 
to organize existing knowledge (i.e., heuristic value), but also on the extent to which it allows 
to gather new knowledge (i.e., predictive value). In the previous section, it was argued that the 
conditioning account of grief has good heuristic value, because it allows to explain a variety 
of grief symptoms and even allows to anchor existing PG theories in a unifying learning 
framework. In this section, I will discuss its predictive value. The theory may inspire future 




factors for developing PG. Second, the theory provides hints on how to conduct treatment.   
 
Risk factors. With respect to the potential risk factors for developing PG, there is 
evidence for individual differences in extinction learning (Guthrie & Bryant, 2006), 
generalization (Lenaert et al., 2014), and habit formation and sign tracking (Flagel, Akil, & 
Robinson, 2009). For example, in the studies of Guthrie and Bryant (2012) and Lenaert et al. 
(2014), participants were invited to the lab to complete an aversive conditioning task 
including, respectively, an extinction or generalization test. Participants were later assessed 
for anxiety symptoms after occurrence of a stressful life-event. In these longitudinal designs, 
slower extinction and wider generalization slopes at baseline predicted more anxiety 
symptoms at follow-up. Similarly, individual differences in extinction and generalization in 
(appetitive) conditioning at baseline (e.g., right before or around the time of the loss) may 
predict the onset of PG. This would provide important evidence for the conditioning account 
of PG, since this account heavily relies on the role of extinction and generalization. In 
addition, it would be of clinical interest, as identification of at-risk individuals would allow 
for efficient prevention (Boddez, Davey, & Vervliet, 2017).  
 
Treatment. With respect to treatment implications, the conditioning account of grief 
opens the door to considering and investigating new treatment options. Whether there is a 
need for treatment in the first place should of course be discussed with the grieving person. A 
guiding principle could be to assess to what extent grieving behaviour interferes with reaching 
other goals (e.g., performance in a work context or taking care of remaining loved ones). That 
being said, some directions are discussed below. 
 




cues with a (high) number of outcomes different from the outcome that drives responding 
(Moritz, Jelinek, Klinge, & Naber, 2007; Schneider et al.,2016). The presumed mechanism is 
that increasing the number of associations reduces the effectiveness of existing associations 
(Anderson, 1974). For example, going to the seaside [where Finn used to go with his 
girlfriend; see above and see 4 in the case study] could be paired with a series of other 
outcomes. From now on, when there, Finn could systematically visit the local art galleries, go 
surfing, etc. This would change the meaning of being at the seaside: It would no longer signal 
being in the presence of his girlfriend, but it would come to signal seeing new art, etc. As 
said, association splitting may be a mechanism that underlies the positive effects of the focus 
on restoration as posited in the model of Stroebe and Schut (1999). Doing new things will 
change the meaning of cues that previously mainly signaled being in the presence of the loved 
one. 
 
Reconsolidation interference. The conditioning approach of grief may also inspire the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of memory reconsolidation interference techniques to reduce 
PG symptoms (for a review see Beckers & Kindt, 2017). An extensive discussion of this 
literature is out of the scope of this paper, but for the present purposes it suffices to indicate 
that this set of techniques is said to have the potential to erase emotional memory by a simple 
pharmacological or behavioural intervention. For example, oral administration of propranolol 
(i.e., a b-adrenergic receptor antagonist) before presenting a fear conditioned cue can 
permanently erase the expression of the fear memory (Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009). One 
popular explanation states that presenting the cue reactivates the corresponding memory trace. 
This means that the person will think back of when the cue was followed by its outcome. A 
theoretical assumption is that a reactivated memory trace has to be placed back in long-term 




supposed to prevent this placing back, which would cause the memory trace to wither and 
lose its ability to elicit emotional responses (Beckers & Kindt, 2017). 
Although translating this to grief may at first sight be taken to imply that loved ones 
may be erased from memory, experimental evidence suggests that the techniques typically 
leave declarative memories intact (e.g., Kindt et al., 2009). That is, although the cues no 
longer elicit aversive responding (e.g., fear-potentiated startle), the participants can typically 
still remember and verbally report the cue-outcome contingencies. Hitherto, this response 
dissociation has mainly been observed in human fear conditioning experiments, but a similar 
pattern would be a valuable treatment outcome to pursue for PG: This would correspond to a 
situation in which the grieving person can be reminded of the lost one without experiencing 
the frustrating craving and search tendencies.  
 
Exposure therapy. The conditioning account is also in line with the success of 
exposure therapy in the treatment of PG (Bryant et al., 2014). Theorists have indeed argued 
that the working ingredient of exposure therapy is the confrontation with conditioned cues 
and the resulting facilitation of extinction learning (Craske et al., 2014). It is worthwhile to 
mention that suggestions to overcome the above-discussed limited generalization of extinction 
and return of responding are available in the literature (e.g., extinction with multiple cues and 
in multiple contexts; Craske et al., 2014; Pittig, van den Berg, Vervliet, 2015). However, 
many of these suggestions are based on research that makes use of fear conditioning 
procedures, so research on how this translates to appetitive conditioning and PG would be 
necessary. In addition, in light of the above-discussed evidence that craving is fairly resistant 
to extinction treatment, it would be interesting to investigate the added value of combining 
techniques such as association splitting with exposure therapy for PG. As mentioned, the 




that a focus on the loss is a necessary element of successful recovery from grief. That is, 
confrontation with reminders of the loved one could help to diminish (some forms of) 
conditioned responding.  
 
Hidden goals. As discussed, grief may also involve habit-like behaviour that is no 
longer driven by the desired outcome that initially installed it. For example, Finn still goes to 
the square where he and his girlfriend used to meet for lunch, even if going there no longer 
results in the desired outcome of being in her presence [see 7 in the case study]. Moors et al. 
(2017) recently put forward that habitual behaviour may, however, still be driven by other 
outcomes than the outcome that initially installed it (i.e., so-called hidden goals). In the case 
of Finn, going the square may, for example, be driven by the desired outcome of paying 
tribute to his deceased girlfriend. Identifying such hidden goals would provide the tool to 
change the behaviour at hand (if that would be therapeutically beneficial). For example, 
encouraging Finn to pay tribute in another and maybe more straightforward way should 
satiate this hidden goal (Moors et al., 2017) and therefore reduce the behaviour of going to the 
square. 
 
Psycho-education. A final treatment implication of the conditioning account of grief is 
that it may inspire the content of psycho-education. Psycho-education about the origin of 
craving could change catastrophic interpretations and, accordingly, alleviate suffering. For 
example, a resurgence of strong craving while being on holiday would be understood as 
caused by a shift away from the context in which extinction learning already took place rather 







 In the present paper, I have put forward a conditioning account of grief behaviour. I 
proposed that the presence of the other person functions as a desired outcome. This simple 
suggestion brought grief behaviour within the scope of universal learning principles. It is my 
hope that the current work will contribute to a better understanding of people suffering from 
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1 It is worth mentioning that additional evidence for this idea was obtained in a new 
laboratory model. In a recent series of three pilot studies, I consistently found that a symbolic 
representation of a loved one (more precisely, the appearance of the name of this person on 
the computer screen) can induce cue-elicited craving. In these studies, two circles of different 
size functioned as cues. One circle systematically preceded the appearance of the name, while 
the other circle never preceded its appearance. Participants reported more longing for the 
loved one when shown the former cue than when shown the latter cue (Y Boddez, 
unpublished observations). 
2  Something similar was found in the three pilot studies mentioned in footnote 1. 
When, in a subsequent phase, both circles were repeatedly presented without the name of the 
loved one, participants quickly reported to no longer expect to get to see the name of the 
loved one. However, despite this reduction in the expectancy measure, they continued to 
report craving for the loved one when seeing the circle that previously preceded the name of 
the loved one (Y Boddez, unpublished observations). 
3It is of note that a meta-analysis suggests that conditioned valence can sometimes be 
reduced due to CS-only presentations after the conditioning phase (be it very slowly). 
However, it has been argued that this is due to habituation of the liking of the CS rather than 
due to extinction learning (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
4More anecdotally, it is of note that one may use also use the habit concept to explain 
the behaviour of the legendary loyal Akita dog Hachiko. His owner would commute to work 
by train and each evening Hachiko would go to the railway station to meet him upon his 
return.  One day at work, his owner died and therefore did not return to the railway station. 
However, Hachiko kept going to the railway station, even if this did not result in the outcome 
of being with his owner anymore (Hachikõ, n.d.).   
